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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
This case is before the Court on writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
regarding that court's rulings in State v. Reber. 2005 UT App. 485, 128 P.3d 1211, and 
State v. C.R.. 2005 UT App. 486 (unpublished). The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §§78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the alleged offenses take place on Indian trust lands? Reber 18; 24; 32; 108; 
188, 307; 468; 504, #4; see also Addenda B and C. 
2. Did the Ute Partition Act of August 27, 1954, expel the Uintah Band as a body 
from the Ute Tribe? Reber 154-155, State v Reber. 128 P.3d at 1214, \%. 
3. Did the trial court deny the Respondents due process of law by reversing the 
burden of proof in the jurisdiction proceedings? Reber, 89-90; 101-102, 263; 579, pp. 2, 
11, 17, 20, 25; 580, pp. 4-5, 14, 30-39, 42-43, 45; 581, pp. 12-14. 
4. Did the trial courts deny the Respondents due process of law by excluding from 
trial evidence of reasonable reliance upon a published court ruling? R 319-323; 335-345; 
346-356; Atkins 73-107; 162-165; Thuneh'rst 74-109; 161-164; C.R. 118-154, 60-82, 32. 
5. Did the trial court err by denying Respondent C.R. the defense of Infancy? C.R. 
118-154,60-82,32. 
6. Were the Respondents prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge? Reber 
276-292; 294-295; 578; 579; 580; 581; 583; 584. 
The issues in this case are all questions of law, subject to a correction of error 
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standard, and according no particular deference to the trial court. Adams v. Swenson. 
2005 UT 8, 108 P.3d 725, 726 (Utah 2005). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Constitutional and Statutory provisions are set forth in Addendum B as follows: 
Article I, Section 8, clause 3, United States Constitution 
Article II, Section 2, clause 2, United States Constitution 
Executive Order of October 3, 1861 
Act of May 5, 1864, ch. LXXVII, 13 Stat. 64 
Article III, Section 2, Utah Constitution 
U.C.A. §76-2-304(2) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondents adopt the State's Statement of the Case, with the following 
additions: (1) In consequence of pretrial rulings, the jury was never permitted to hear that 
Mr. Reber was on Indian land, that he was an Indian, or that he had reason to believe he 
could rely on federal rulings that defined that Indian status. The jury returned a guilty 
verdict in under 7 minutes. Reber 584, pp. 168-169, 171-175, 182-187, 192-195. 
(2) On June 1, 2004, Respondents Tex Atkins and Steve Thunehorst entered pleas 
of No Contest to reduced charges on condition that all issues be reserved for appeal. 
Atkins 168-170; 180-182; Thunehorst 167-169; 179-181. 
(3) The trial court ordered that all fines and restitution be held by the court 
pending the outcome of all appeals. Reber 562-565. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 3, 1861, the Uinta Valley Indian reservation was created by 
executive order of President Abraham Lincoln. Congress confirmed this Order on May 5, 
1864, stating that the Uinta Valley was "set apart for the permanent settlement and 
exclusive occupation of such of the different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory as 
may be induced to inhabit the same." Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 57, 13 Stat. 64. Reber 123. 
2. The Department of the Interior thereupon set up the Uinta Agency to manage 
the affairs of the Uinta Valley Reserve. Those Indians who were located in the Uinta 
Valley and came under the jurisdiction of the Agency became known as the "Uintah 
Band." Few if any members of the Uintah Band were ethnically Ute. Reber 151. 
3. The Respondents, Rickie Reber, Tex Atkins, Steve Thunehorst, and C.R. are 
Indians of Utah Territory whose rights were reserved under the 1861 Order and the 1864 
Act. R. 122; Atkins 73; Thunehorst 74; C.R. 154. They are members of the Uintah Band. 
3. In 1880, the Whiteriver Band and the Uncompahgre Utes relinquished all claim 
to all lands within the continental United States, and in 1881 were brought under military 
escort to Utah from Colorado. 
4. The Uintah Band, the White River Band, and the Uncompahgre Utes continue 
to maintain their separate identities to the present day. These separate identities have been 
recognized by numerous acts of Congress. No Act or treaty conferred upon the White-
river Band or the Uncompahgre Utes any of the rights reserved to the Uintah Band under 
the 1861 Order or the 1864 Act. Reber 152. 
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5. All Indian rights in the Uinta Valley under the 1861 Order and the 1864 Act are 
those of the Uintah Band, inasmuch as neither the Whiterivers nor the Uncompahgres 
inhabited the reservation in 1861, nor are they "Indians of said [Utah] territory," as set 
forth in the Act of May 5, 1864. Reber 232. 
6. From 1887 to 1934, Congress engaged in a policy of alloting parcels of land to 
individual Indians. All lands subsequently obtained in Utah by the Whiteriver Band and 
the Uncompahgre Utes were obtained through allotment. In contrast, the Uintah Band 
retained jurisdiction over the entire reservation secured to it by the Act of May 5, 1864. 
7. The Uintah Band has always maintained a distinctly different culture and 
lifestyle from the other two bands. This included intermarriage with other tribes and non-
Indians, and a higher standard of living and education. Accordingly, the Uintah Band has 
always been known throughout the reservation as the "Mixed-bloods." Reber 419-425. 
8. Under Acts enacted by Congress from 1902 to 1905, the reservation was opened 
to non-Indian settlement. In 1931, the Uintah Band received compensation for lands taken 
from it under those Acts. Unfortunately, these funds were distributed to all three bands 
rather than to the Uintah Band alone, to whom they rightfully belonged. 
9. Under the Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), tribal lands 
were to be restored to Indian tribes, but only upon their adopting a constitution approved 
by the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. §463. Many tribes refused to do so, 
considering it an affront to their culture. Nevertheless, in 1937, the Ihree bands adopted a 
constitution as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
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10. Nothing in the constitution surrendered any rights or assets possessed by any 
one band to either of the other two, nor diminished or abrogated any of the rights 
possessed by any of the separate bands. Reber 152, Contrast Reber, 128 P.3d at 1214, f8. 
11. In accordance with the Wheeler-Howard Act, the lands of the reservation were 
restored to the Indian tribe to whom they belonged, namely, the Uintah Band. The Uintah 
Band continued to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over the lands reserved 
to it under the Act of May 5, 1864, and the other two bands continued to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over their allotments, leading to no small amount of friction. 
12. During the 1940's all three bands brought actions before the United States 
Court of Claims to be compensated for lands taken by the United States. The two 
Colorado bands, together with the three bands of the Southern Utes still resident in 
Colorado, sued in regard to their Colorado lands, and the Uintah Band sued as to its 
aboriginal lands in Utah. 133,000 acres of these Uintah lands at White Mesa in southern 
Utah were, and still are, occupied by the Southern Utes. 
13. In process of time, the United States offered the Colorado bands a settlement. 
It was originally proposed that 60% of the Colorado funds be given to the Southern Utes 
and 40% to the Northern Utes, i.e., the Whiteriver and Uncompahgre Bands. However, in 
order to resolve the claims of the Uintah Band as well, it was subsequently proposed that 
the Southern Utes receive 40%, together with the Uintah lands at White Mesa, that the 
Northern Utes receive 60%, and that the Uintah Band receive a share of that 60% in 
recognition of their own funds having been misappropriated in 1931, on condition that the 
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Whiteriver and Uncompahgre Bands release the federal government from all liability for 
distributing funds to the Uintah Band to which it otherwise would have no claim. 
14. In order to receive the settlement funds and to resolve some of the issues 
regarding use of reservation lands, the three bands entered into a series of agreements 
which came to be known as the "Share and Share-alike agreements." In an extremely 
poorly drafted piece of legislation, these resolutions were enacted into law by Congress 
without reproducing the text of the resolutions in either the Act itself or in its supporting 
documentation. 25 U.S.C. §672. 
15. The 1950 agreements did not purport to unify the three bands into one tribe. 
They made no mention of the reserved treaty rights of the separate bands, and they left 
hunting and fishing under the control of the separate bands. The so-called "Mixed 
bloods" (i.e., the Uintah Band) were party to these agreements. Contrast State v. Reber, 
128P.3datl214,f8. 
16. From 1953 until 1966 Congress engaged in a policy of "terminating" federal 
supervision over select Indian tribes. The policy has since been entirely discredited and 
denounced by Congress, beginning with President Richard Nixon's Special Message to 
the Congress on Indian Affairs. Pub. Papers 564 (Richard M. Nixon, July 8, 1970). 
Termination applied only to federal benefits. It had no effect on tribal identity, nor on 
vested treaty rights, such as hunting and fishing. Reber 154 
17. On August 27, 1954, Congress passed the "Ute Partition Act" or UPA. (68 
Stat. 877). The UPA expelled all "mixed-blood Indians/' or in other words, 70% of the 
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Uintah Band, from the Ute Tribe. At no time did the Uintah Band ever vote on this 
action, and no law has ever permitted the Whiteriver Band or the Uncompahgre Utes to 
expel the Uintah Band. See Addendum E; Reber 238-251. 
18. The Uintah Band that was party to the 1950 agreements is the same Uintah 
Band that was terminated from federal supervision under the 1954 Act. However, the 
1954 Act did not purport to amend or abrogate the 1950 agreements, and the 1950 
agreements are still considered to be in effect. Hackford v. Babbitt. 14 F.3d 1457, 1461 
(10th Cir. 1994). 
19. On July 16, 1958, the Ute Tribal Business Committee passed Resolution 58-
163, which states in pertinent part (Reber 161; 205; 307; 421; 504): 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL 
BUSINESS COMMITTEE That the fish and game upon all lands to be 
received by the Mixed-Blood group pursuant to the agreed division, as 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall, from the date hereof, be 
under the management and control of the Mixed-Blood group exclusively 
and said Mixed-Blood group, should they so desire, may sell hunting and 
fishing permits or licenses and retain all funds derived therefrom without 
accounting to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
20. Since 1954, the Uintah Band has continued to function as an independent 
Indian tribe. In 2002, the 10th Circuit reaffirmed that termination is restricted to 
withdrawal of federal benefits, and that terminated tribes retain their tribal identity and all 
vested treaty rights. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conwav. 286 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2002). 
21. In 1997, the 10th Circuit ruled that all lands within the exterior boundaries of 
the Uintah and Ouray Indian reservation, except those lands homesteaded under the 1902-
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1905 Acts of Congress, remain tribal land. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reserva-
tion v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513, 1529 (10th Or. 1997)(UteV). Reber 25; 87-88; 99-100; 227. 
22. At the time of the alleged offenses, Mr. Reber, Mr. Atkins, Mr. Thunehorst, 
and C.R. were acting in reliance upon the 10th Circuit's rulings in Ute V and Conway, the 
1958 Tribal Resolution, and other official declarations. Reber 342; 353; Atkins 74; 
Thunehorst 75, C.R. 118-154. 
23. The Respondents are all accused of hunting on lands defined as tribal trust 
lands under Ute V. Reber 18; 122; 504, #4; Atkins 73; Thunehorst 74; C.R. 155. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The arguments set forth below follow a logical sequence: First, the Court of 
Appeals correctly held that the State lacks jurisdiction over the Respondents because the 
alleged offenses took place on Indian land. This should be the beginning and end of the 
discussion. That land was tribal trust land. However, even if this Court should determine 
that it was not tribal trust land, it is still land falling under exclusive tribal and federal 
jurisdiction as ordered by the 10th Circuit. In either case, the State's arguments as to regu-
latory authority over wildlife rest on a false factual premise, and are thus irrelevant. 
Second, even if this Court should be persuaded that the State has jurisdiction over 
the land, it still lacks jurisdiction over the Respondents, because they are members of the 
Uintah Band who were exercising treaty rights of user to hunt and fish within the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. These rights exist independent of the 
Ute Tribe because the Uintah Band was expelled as a body from the Ute Tribe in 1954. 
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Third, even if this Court should be persuaded that the State has jurisdiction over 
both the land and the people, both the adult and juvenile Respondents were nevertheless 
prohibited from presenting any defense evidence whatsoever to the trial courts, while the 
State was never required to meet even its minimum evidentiary burden as to jurisdiction. 
The Respondents were thus denied Due Process of Law. If this Court does not affirm the 
Court of Appeals on that basis alone, the Respondents are at least entitled to new trials. 
Finally, the trial court judge displayed manifest bias throughout the adult proceed-
ings, and the Respondents were thus prejudiced in their defense. In the event this Court 
remands those cases for new trials, they should be held before a judge who is impartial. 
ARGUMENT 
L The Land: The State of Utah has no jurisdiction over tribal trust lands. 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the Respondents were hunting on Indian 
lands, as defined under the controlling authority, Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray 
Reservation v. Utah. 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Or. 1997)( hereinafter Ute VI This was based 
not only on the facts established in the record, but upon the State's own assertions in its 
briefing, as well as its statements at oral argument. See Case No. 20040371-CA, Ap'lee's 
Br. at 16; also ApTants' Ans. to Pet. for Rehearing, Addendum C, pp. 4-5. Its subsequent 
rationale regarding the regulatory and property interests of the resident tribes was merely 
an extension of this primary rationale regarding the location of the alleged offenses. 
The State's entire argument is now based on the premise that the Respondents 
were not hunting on "Indian lands" at all, but on private fee lands owned by non-Indians. 
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The State goes so far as to assert that "no record evidence suggests that [the crime] was 
committed on Indian lands, which are lands held in trust for an Indian tribe or an 
individual Indian." Pet. Br. at 6. The State's position is outright false. The trust status of 
the land was repeatedly demonstrated to the trial court, (Reber 18; 24; 32; 108; 188; 307) 
including an authenticated (468) letter jfrom the Uintah County Recorder that the land was 
non-fee land, held by the federal government, and Indian country under Ute V. Reber 
504, #4; Addendum D: Letter from Randy Simmons, Uintah County Recorder. 
The State concedes in its own brief that tribal and federal jurisdiction over tribal 
trust lands is exclusive. Pet. Br. at 15-16. Thus, the sole question is not whether an Indian 
tribe has a regulatory or property interest in wildlife on non-Indian lands within the 
reservation, as is so elaborately argued by the State, but whether the lands m question are 
"non-Indian lands" at all. The record clearly establishes that the alleged offenses took 
place on tribal trust lands as defined by Ute V, and that, pursuant to Ute V, they are 
subject to exclusive tribal and federal jurisdiction. 114 F.3d at 1518. Any discussion of 
jurisdiction over Indian lands on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation begins and ends with 
Ute V. Yet, rather than addressing this specific ruling on point, the State instead asks this 
Court to reinvent the wheel without any reference to Ute V at all. Very siniply, the State's 
argument is completely irrelevant to the facts of this case. 
In UteV. the 10th Circuit brought its own ruling in Ute IIL 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 
1985) into harmony with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). The 10th Circuit first found that Hagen had 
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no effect on the National Forest Lands, nor on the Uncompahgre Reservation, i.e., both 
are still Indian land. 114 F.3d at 1529. More specifically, the court stated that "the lands 
retained their reservation status and remained Indian country, subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Tribe and the federal government" 114 F.3d at 1518 (emphasis added). In other 
words, the entire Uncompahgre Reservation, including where Mr. Reber and C.R. are 
accused of hunting, remains trust land. The same applies to the location where Mr. Atkins 
and Mr. Thunehorst were accused of hunting. 
"Trust lands" are lands owned by the United States, but held in trust for the use of 
the Indians. The fact that the bulk of the Uncompahgre Reservation is managed by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) rather than by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
does not divest the United States of title to the land, nor does it remove it from trust 
status. This is the specific meaning of the Ute Indian Tribe rulings. Indeed, neither at 
trial, nor on appeal, nor in the present petition, has the State ever provided any facts, 
statutes, or rulings that would indicate how the land in question has ever passed out of 
trust status or into the possession of the State of Utah. 
After defining the extent of trust lands on the reservation the Ute V court stated: 
The remaining controversy centers on whether the state and local 
defendants or the Tribe and the federal government have jurisdiction over 
the various categories of non-trust {i.e., fee), lands within the original 
boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation, whether held by Indians or 
non-Indians. 
114 F.3d at 1529 (parenthetical in original). The court clearly defined jurisdiction 
as an "either-or" proposition. Either the state and local governments could exercise 
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jurisdiction, or the Tribe and the federal government. It naturally follows that the Tribe 
would have jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands and the federal government would 
have jurisdiction over non-Indians, to the exclusion of the State. The Ute V court also 
made clear that all lands not defined by the court as non-trust must necessarily constitute 
trust lands. The court then went on to define the non-trust lands within the reservation: 
(a) lands that passed from trust to fee status pursuant to non-Indian 
settlement under the 1902-1905 allotment legislation; 
(b) land apportioned to the "Mixed Blood" Utes under the Ute Partition 
Act, Act of Aug. 27, 1954, Pub.L. No. 97-698, ch. 1009, 68 Stat. 868 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§677-677aa); 
(c) lands allotted to individual Indians that have passed into fee status after 
1905;and 
(d) lands that were held in trust after the Reservation opened in 1905 but 
that since have been exchanged into fee status by the Tribe for then-fee 
(now trust) lands in an effort to consolidate its land holdings pursuant to the 
Indian Reorganization Act, Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§461-79) and the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 
1983, Pub.L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2517 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§2201-11). 
114 F.3d at 1529. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the only lands that have 
ever passed to State jurisdiction are homesteads and townsites settled under the 1902-
1905 legislation. All other lands remain Indian country, and those lands not delineated in 
the quote above remain trust lands. The Respondents were hunting on trust lands. 
There are no grey areas as to jurisdiction on the reservation. The fine distinctions 
which the State is now asserting between "Indian Country," "reservation land," "tribal 
lands," and "Indian lands" were specifically laid to rest in Ute V. The State would now 
argue that lands explicitly defined as Indian under Ute V nevertheless fall under State 
jurisdiction by virtue of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 
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L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). Yet by its own terms, Montana does not apply to the facts of this 
case. Indeed, at the opening of that ruling, Justice Stewart stated, "This case concerns the 
sources and scope of the power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-
Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians" 450 U.S.at 
547, 101 S.Ct. at 1249 (emphasis added). This was explicitly repeated in the body of the 
opinion: "Though the parties in this case have raised broad questions about the power of 
the Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on the reservation, the regulatory 
issue before us is a narrow one. . . . What remains is the question of the power of the 
Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by 
nonmembers of the Tribe." 450 U.S. at 557, 101 S.Ct. at 1254 (Emphasis added). The 
ultimate ruling in Montana was that the bed and banks of the Bighorn River were never 
part of the reservation, but instead passed from the United States to the State of Montana 
upon Montana's admission into the Union. Those lands therefore became the equivalent 
of fee lands held by non-members of the tribe. As such, they were not subject to tribal 
jurisdiction. 450 U.S. at 556-557, 101 S.Ct. at 1254. 
These issues have no bearing on the Reber case, as there is no dispute that Mr. 
Reber and the other Respondents were on non-fee lands, held by the federal government, 
for which "the ownership of the land by the tribal group" has never been disturbed. 
Reber. f9, fc/Ymg Ute IIL 773 F.2d at 1092). 
The only significance of the Montana ruling is that it was issued in 1981, three 
months before the first of the several Ute Indian Tribe rulings. In fact, Montana has been 
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cited as controlling authority in all of the Ute Indian Tribe rulings as supporting tribal and 
federal jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the State. These are the very rulings the State is 
now trying to circumvent. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 at 1077, 1146, 
1156 (D. Utah 1981)(UteJ); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 at 1100 (10th Cir. 
1985)(Seymour, J., concurringVUte III); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 935 F.Supp. 1473 at 
1506, 1508, 1509, 1514-1516 (D. Utah 1996)(Ute_IV), and Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 
F.3d 1513 at 1524 (10th Cir. 1997)(UteV). In marked contrast, Montana was never cited 
in Hagen, nor in any of its predecessor state cases. 
The State attempts to reinforce its Montana argument by citing to Strate v. A-l 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). That case involved 
State civil jurisdiction over a traffic accident that occurred on a State highway crossing an 
Indian reservation on a dedicated State right-of-way. As in Montana, the Strate court 
clearly stated that its ruling applies strictly to civil jurisdiction over fee lands owned by 
non-Indians. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442, 456, 459, 117 S.Ct. at 1407, 1414, 1416; Montana, 
450 U.S. at 547, 557, 101 S.Ct. at 1249, 1254. In contrast, Reber pertains to criminal 
jurisdiction over federal, non-fee land within the reservation, explicitly defined as trust 
land by a competent court. Indeed, the issue in Reber is precisely the issue that was 
before the 10th Circuit in all of the Ute Indian Tribe cases (Ute I through V). The State 
has provided no facts or law that would demonstrate that the Court of Appeals erred in 
abiding by the Ute Indian Tribe cases, cases to which the State of Utah was a party. 
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IL The People: The 1950 Agreements had no effect on the vested rights of 
the Uintah Band. 
The Court of Appeals' ruling in State v. Reber is based on the premise that the Ute 
Indian Tribe, not the State of Utah, was the victim of the alleged offense, because the Ute 
Tribe has a regulatory interest over hunting and fishing on the reservation. Reber, f 1(9-11. 
This ruling is correct to the extent that it finds that the State has no jurisdiction, as well as 
to the extent it recognizes the priority of tribal interests in hunting and fishing. It is 
incorrect, however, to the extent it rests upon the premise "that the separate Bands ceased 
to exist outside the Ute Tribe, and the Ute Tribe maintained jurisdiction over the 
reservation areas and the hunting and fishing rights." Reber f 8. 
A. The Ute Partition Act of August 27, 1954, expelled the Uintah Band as a body 
from the Confederated Ute Tribe. 
The State lacks jurisdiction not because such jurisdiction would infringe upon the 
regulatory interests of the Ute Tribe, but because it would infringe upon the treaty rights 
of the Uintah Band, over which the Ute Tribe has no jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals 
reliance on Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457 (10th Cir. 1994), and United States v. 
Murdock, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997) is thus misplaced. In neither of those cases was 
the 10th Circuit provided with the critical information that the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§677 et seq.y expelled the Uintah Band as a body from the Ute Tribe. Reber 154-155. 
Instead, both cases relied on United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985), 
which dealt solely with the relation of individuals terminated under the Partition Act with 
the Ute Tribe, not the effect of the Partition Act upon the Uintah Band as a tribe. 
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B. Members of the Uintah Band possess all rights of user reserved to the Band 
under the Executive Order of October 3. 186L and the Act of May 5, 1864. 
Felter held that hunting and fishing rights belong to tribes as a whole, not to 
individual members. 752 F.2d at 1509. Hackford likewise held that water rights belong to 
tribes as a whole. 14 F.3d at 1469. Both rulings are relevant and binding to the extent that 
individual members of tribes are entitled to rights of user in those rights possessed by the 
tribe as a whole. It is thus significant that the UPA expelled the Uimtah Band from the Ute 
Tribe as a body. Neither the 1937 Ute Constitution nor the 1950 Agreements have any 
bearing on the separate treaty rights retained by the Uintah Band upon its 1954 expulsion. 
Federal law is very clear that terminated tribes retain their tribal identity and treaty rights, 
and specifically hunting and fishing rights. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 
1203 (10th Cir. 2002). The inquiry for the Court of Appeals was thus not whether the Ute 
Tribe has a regulatory interest in the reservation, but whether the Respondents were 
exercising rights of user as members of the Uintah Band. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 72, n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684, n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); Zarrv. 
Barlow. 800 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1986). 
In summary, even if it should be determined that the State of Utah has somehow 
obtained jurisdiction within the reservation over non-fee lands owned by the United 
States, it still could not exercise jurisdiction over the Respondents, who were exercising 
rights of the Uintah Band on lands where Indians indisputably have a right to hunt 
without State interference, even under the State's strange understanding of Ute V. The 
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State lacks jurisdiction regardless, and the Court of Appeals' ruling should therefore be 
affirmed on that basis. 
III. Due Process of Law: The Court of Appeals' ruling may be sustained on any basis 
apparent from the record. 
A prevailing party may urge any ground in support of a favorable judgment, and 
this Court may affirm a judgment "on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." 
Dipomav. McPhie. 29 P.3d 1225, 1230 (Utah 2001). The Court of Appeals was apprized 
that the Respondents never had their day in court. Prior to trial, they were prohibited from 
effectively challenging the State's assertion of jurisdiction. At trial, they were prohibited 
from presenting the jury with any defense evidence whatsoever. Even if this Court should 
find that the Court of Appeals erred as to jurisdiction, the Respondents are nevertheless 
entitled to a new trial, before an impartial judge. 
The Court of Appeals was briefed on 31 additional issues which it found 
unnecessary to address in light of its ruling. Each of these remain valid alternate grounds 
for sustaining that court in vacating the Respondents' convictions, and the Respondents 
advance each of those grounds in support of that ruling. See Appellants' Brief, Case No. 
20040371-CA, pp. 32-73. The most urgent of those points are emphasized below. 
A. The Respondents were denied due process in the jurisdiction proceedings. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law for the court prior to trial. U.C.A. 
§76-1-201(5), State v. Pavne. 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995)(the same Judge Payne). When 
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the burden of proof is upon the State to estabhsh 
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jurisdiction. State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah App. 1988). To shift "the burden 
of proof on the fact of jurisdiction to defendant [is] in violation of the due process clause 
of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution." State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d at 470. 
1. The burden of proof was improperly shifted to the Respondents. The trial judge 
stated: 
"Federal statutes do not address the issue of who has the burden to 
prove that a defendant (or victim) is an Indian or that the crime occurred in 
'Indian Country.' The Utah Appellate Court in Hagen stated: 'The State 
properly concedes that the prosecution was required to prove jurisdiction, 
i.e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of 
evidence." 
Reber 262. The trial court then reversed the burden nonetheless, and required Mr. 
Reber to prove he is an Indian. Yet the mandate in State v. Hagen 802 P.2d 745 (Utah 
App. 1990) is unambiguous: The State bears the burden to disprove Indian status. This is 
the law that should have been applied by the trial court. 
2. The Respondents were improperly prohibited from presenting evidence of their 
Indian status. Having placed the burden upon the Respondents to establish their Indian 
status, the court then refused to accept any evidence regarding the location of the offense 
or the Uintah Band. This is the very definition of denying due process. Marshall v. 
Jerrico. Inc.. 446 U.S. 243, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). 
3. The State failed to rebut the Respondents' prima facie case. Throughout the 
proceedings in the trial court, the Respondents made more than sufficient allegations to 
establish at least prima facie that they were members of the Uintah Band on Indian land. 
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Under Ute_V, the State was obligated to produce a title search demonstrating that the land 
had been homesteaded and thus came under State jurisdiction. 114 F.3d at 1517. Not only 
did it never do so, it was never even called upon to do so, and the Respondents were 
prohibited by the trial court from introducing evidence to the contrary. Reber 264. 
Likewise, the State made no effort to show that the Uintah Band are not the 
Indians covered by the Act of May 5, 1864, or that the Respondents are not members of 
the Uintah Band. It never called a single witness, nor even responded to the Respondents' 
allegations. Yet the trial court found that the State had proven jurisdiction! With what 
facts, the record does not show. Reber 264. Even if this Court were to find that the State 
has jurisdiction in principle, no trial record has been established upon which such 
jurisdiction can be determined unless the matter is remanded. 
B. The Respondents were entitled to present evidence as to Mistake of Law under 
U.C.A. §76-2-304. 
U.C.A. §76-2-304(2) sets forth the elements of the defense of mistake of law. See 
Addendum B. The elements of the affirmative defense of Mistake of Law are: 
1. The defendant acted out of mistake or ignorance of the law; 
2. The mistake or ignorance was based on a reasonable reliance; 
3. The reliance was upon a written statement of the law; 
4. The written statement of the law was either: 
a. an order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by 
law with interpreting the law; or 
b. a published court opinion. 
The right to due process of law includes the right to reasonably rely upon a 
published interpretation of the law. United States v. Caceres. 440 U.S. 741, 753 n.15, 99 
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S.Ct 1465, 1472 n. 15, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979). This specifically includes the right to rely 
on rulings issued by the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v. Peltier. 422 
U.S. 531, 541-542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2319-2320, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). Likewise, under 
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution, defendants are entitled to present evidence of the 
interpretation of the law they have relied upon. South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson. 61 
P.3d 282, 285 (Utah App. 2002). Under Utah law, this is so even if the interpretation they 
have relied upon is not binding upon the court, IcL 
1. Prohibiting the presentation of evidence prejudiced the Respondents. There is 
no question that the rulings of the 10th Circuit in Ute V and Conwaiy constitute published 
court rulings within the meaning of U.C.A. §76-2-304(2)(b)(ii). They are in writing, as 
required in order to invoke the defense. State v. Norton, 67 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Utah App. 
2003). They are also issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Gallegos v. State, 828 
S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex.App. Houston 1st Dist. 1992). Likewise, the written proclamations 
of the Ute Tribe, the written opinion of the Solicitor General of the United States, and the 
declarations of Uintah elders, constitute orders or grants of permission by administrative 
agencies charged with interpreting the law within the meaning of U.C.A. §76-2-304(2). 
All of these were relied upon in good faith by the Respondents, but one were admitted 
into evidence. Reber 319-323; Atkins 162-165; Thunehorst 161-164; 584, pp. 21-23. In 
essence, the Respondents were prevented from presenting any defense at all. There can be 
no question that their defense was prejudiced by this exclusion. 
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2. Reasonableness is a question of fact for the jury. Reasonableness is a question 
of fact Texas P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 197, 238, 16 
S.Ct. 666, 682, 40 L.Ed. 940 (1896). As a question of fact, reasonableness is the 
exclusive province of the jury. State v. Cravens. 15 P.3d 635, 639 (Utah App. 2000). 
"Defendant's intent, or purpose, is a fact for the determination of the jury." State v. 
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1980). 
Contrary to the foregoing, the trial court held that the Respondents' reliance upon 
the rulings of the 10th Circuit, the proclamations of the Ute Tribe, and the advice of their 
own tribal elders could not be reasonable as a matter of law. Reber 319-323. It is hard to 
understand how the Respondents could be unreasonable in believing they were on tribal 
land when the Court of Appeals subsequently held that they were in fact on tribal land. 
3. Respondents were entitled to jury instructions as to reasonable reliance and 
Mistake of Law. Prior to trial, Mr. Reber submitted proposed jury instructions based upon 
U.C.A. §§76-2-304(2)(b) 76-2-308, and 76-1-502. Reber 428-441. These instructions 
were prepared in anticipation that some amount of evidence would be introduced as to his 
own Indian status and the Indian status of the location of the alleged offense. The jury is 
entitled to a clear instruction setting forth the burden of proof on an affirmative defense. 
State v. Torres. 619 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980). 
Essentially, the only evidence the jury was allowed to hear was that John Reber, 
the Mr. Reber's brother, was born in an Indian hospital. Reber 584, p. 180. John Reber 
did testify at length about his own and his brother's rights in the Uintah Band, and their 
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belief that they were on Indian land. However, the court did not allow the jury to hear 
even this small amount of evidence. Reber 584, pp. 182-187. This was only a fraction of 
the extensive testimony the Respondents attempted to introduce. Reber 305-309; 354-
356; Atkins 73-92, Thunehorst 74-103; 504. Nevertheless, it would have been sufficient 
to require that the jury receive the proposed instructions. It was reversible error by the 
court to exclude this testimony, and it was error to exclude the proposed jury instructions. 
This error is a sufficient alternate ground to support the Court of Appeals ruling. 
C. Respondent C.R. cannot be held culpable for the offense charged. 
Intent is an element in every offense, no less so when the defendant is a juvenile. 
U.C.A. §§76-2-101 etseq. The State completely failed to prove intent on C.R.'s part, and 
completely failed to refute evidence that he lacked intent. 
1. C.R. cannot be held liable for acting at the direction of his father. 
There is no question that at the time of the alleged offense, C.R. was acting at the 
direct instruction of his father. While numerous cases address the liability of an adult who 
directs a child to commit an allegedly criminal act, they are not relevant at this point, 
inasmuch as C.R.'s father was, in fact, prosecuted for the alleged offense as well. Far 
more rarely addressed, a child who was acting at the direction of an adult cannot be held 
culpable. Commonwealth v. Mead. 10 Allen (92 Mass.) 398, 399-400 (1865); McCture v. 
Com.. 81 Ky. 448, 451 (1883). Both C.R. and his father were acting in reliance on 
published rulings of the 10th Circuit. If Mr. Reber cannot be held liable under the 
principle of Mistake of Law, C.R. certainly cannot be held liable for obeying his father. 
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2. C.R. is presumed incompetent to commit a crime unless proven otherwise 
beyond a reasonable doubt. U.C.A. §76-2-301 states: 
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before 
he reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall in no way limit the 
jurisdiction or proceedings before the juvenile courts of this state. 
This section incorporates the common law rule of infancy, which holds that a child 
is incapable of committing a crime up to the age of 7, and is thereafter presumed 
incapable of committing a crime until the age of 14, unless the presumption is rebutted by 
the state by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile 
Court. Andrew Walkover, 31 U.C.L.A. 503, 504 (1984); see also Chatwin v. United 
States. 326 U.S. 455, 461, 66 S.Ct. 233, 236, 90 L.Ed. 198, 201 (1946)(Infancy defense 
applicable in Utah); 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 23, 24 (1800). 
C.R.is alleged to have committed the offense on October 27, 2002. As set forth in 
the petition, he did not turn 14 until December 30, 2002. He thus falls within the scope of 
U.C.A. §76-2-301 and is presumed incompetent to be convicted unless the State over-
comes this presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 
A.2d 21, 29 (1954). Because C.R. reasonably relied upon his father, upon the rulings of 
the 10th Circuit, upon the proclamations of the Ute Tribe, and upon the tribal elders of the 
Uintah Band, the State never met this burden. Regardless of what action this Court may 
take in regard to the adult Respondents, C.R.'s conviction should remain vacated. 
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IV. Judicial Bias: The Respondents were prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial 
judge. 
The Uintah people have had extensive experience in trying to obtain justice 
through Judge Payne. The Court of Appeals was apprized of his bias in the case of State 
v. Valdez. Case No. 20010146-CA, 65 P.3d 1191 (Utah App. 2003). The two issues 
presented in regard to bias are (1) was the trial judge biased? and (2) was that bias 
properly brought before the appropriate forum? In this case, the judge's bias was apparent 
throughout the whole of the proceedings, and this is reflected in the record. Reber 276-
292; 294-295; 578, pp. 3-5; 579, pp. 6-10; 580, pp. 14-28; 581, pp. 28-35, 44; 583, pp. 4-
5; 584, pp. 10-11, 13, 73, 74, 109-121, 125-126, 150, 168-169, 172-175, 190-195. 
The only remaining question is whether this bias was properly addressed in the 
court below. In this regard, a plain error analysis is most helpful. If (i) there was bias, (ii) 
the bias was obvious, and (iii) the bias was harmful, this Court is within its rights to 
address the issue. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). The true measure of 
prejudice on the part of the trial judge may best be expressed by the variance between the 
trial court's rulings and the facts and law presented in opposition to those rulings. But for 
the trial judge's clear bias against all Indians of Utah Territory, it is apparent that the 
proceedings in the trial court would have taken an entirely different course. Campbell 
Maack & Sessions v. Debry. 38 P.3d 984, 992 (Utah App. 2001); see also Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1)(a). If the Respondents are to be tried at all, they should 
be tried in an impartial forum with proper jurisdiction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the Respondents were on Indian land, 
and that this was dispositive. It could have stopped there, and indeed, the ruling should be 
affirmed to that extent. However, even if this Court were to somehow find that the State 
has obtained jurisdiction over Indian lands, it still has no jurisdiction over the Respon-
dents, who were exercising rights of user as members of the Uintah Band on those lands. 
The ruling should therefore be affirmed and modified, either to recognize that State 
jurisdiction ends where tribal jurisdiction begins, without reference to a specific tribe, or 
to acknowledge the Respondents' rights as members of the Uintah Band. 
The Court of Appeals ruling also demonstrates conclusively that the Respondents 
were not unreasonable in believing they were on Indian land. Under the Due Process 
clauses of the U.S. Constitution, as well as U.C.A. §76-2-304(2), the Respondents had a 
right to present this belief to a jury. If, after all is said and done, this Court is nevertheless 
persuaded that the State has jurisdiction over both the land and the Respondents, the 
Respondents are nevertheless entitled to present the defense of reasonable reliance and 
Mistake of Law before an impartial forum, and this Court should, in that case, so order. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2006. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Respondents 
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BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Hi Defendant Reber appeals his conviction for one count of 
aiding or assisting in wanton destruction of protected wildlife, 
a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code sections 23-20-4 
and -23. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-4, -23 (2003 & Supp. 2005). 
Defendants Thunehorst and Atkins appeal their conditional pleas 
of attempted wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a class B 
misdemeanor. See id. We vacate each conviction for lack of 
state jurisdiction. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 During the 2002 deer hunting season in Uintah County, 
Reber!s son shot and killed a large mule deer with Reber!s 
assistance. Later, Reber drove his truck through a Utah Division 
of Wildlife Resources checkpoint with the trophy buck in the bed 
of the truck. They did not have a state permit, license, or tag 
attached to the animal. The State charged Reber with aiding and 
assisting in the wanton destruction of wildlife. Because Reber1s 
son shot a trophy buck, the crime constituted a third degree 
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4(3) (a) . During that same 
hunting season, Defendant Atkins shot a buck in Uintah County and 
Defendant Thunehorst assisted him. They were both charged with 
class A misdemeanors. See id. § 23-20-4(3) (b) . 
f3 Reber filed a motion to dismiss his case for lack of 
jurisdiction, claiming that he is an Indian and was hunting in 
Indian Country. Atkins and Thunehorst stipulated with the State 
that the district court's ruling on jurisdiction in Reber's case 
would apply to their respective cases. The district court denied 
Reber's motion, and the jury convicted him. Atkins and 
Thunehorst entered conditional pleas to class B misdemeanors. 
Defendants separately appealed, and the Atkins and Thunehorst 
appeals were consolidated with the Reber appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
|^4 Defendants assert that the State lacked jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, and 
we accord no particular deference to the district court's 
decision. See Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
ANALYSIS 
i|5 Defendants claim that the State lacked jurisdiction because 
they are Indians who exercised federally protected rights on 
Indian land. The Utah Constitution provides: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm 
and declare that they forever disclaim all 
right and title to the unappropriated public 
lands lying within the boundaries hereof, and 
1. Defendants raise and address other issues not covered in this 
opinion. Because we conclude that the State did not have 
jurisdiction, we need not address the other issues. 
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to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and 
that until the title thereto shall have been 
extinguished by the United States, the same 
shall be and remain subject to the 
disposition of the United States, and said 
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of 
the United States. 
Utah Const, art. III. Therefore, the federal government has 
jurisdiction over Indian lands until the Congress of the United 
States relinquishes such right. See id. 
1|6 The State of Utah may assert "jurisdiction over Indians and 
Indian territory, country, and lands or any portion thereof 
within this state in accordance with the consent of the United 
States given by the Act of Congress of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 
78-80 (Public Law 284, 90th Congress), to the extent authorized 
by that act and this chapter.11 Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-201 (2003). 
Utah Code section 9-9-213 provides for concurrent state and 
federal jurisdiction over hunting on reservations. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 9-9-213 (2003) . In order for section 9-9-213 to apply, 
and thus allow the State to assert jurisdiction, certain 
preliminary requirements must be met. Pursuant to Utah Code 
section 9-9-202, 
[s]tate jurisdiction acquired or retroceded 
pursuant to this chapter with respect to 
criminal offenses or civil causes of action 
shall be applicable in Indian country only 
where the enrolled Indians residing within 
the affected area of the Indian country 
accept state jurisdiction or request its 
retrocession by a majority vote of the adult 
Indians voting at a special election held for 
that purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-202 (2 003). The court in United States v. 
Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1508 n.7 (10th Cir. 1985), noted that 
"[u]nder current law, Indian tribes must consent to any state 
assumption of jurisdiction over 'Indian Country.' Although Utah 
since has indicated its willingness to assume this jurisdiction, 
no Indian tribe has accepted its offer." Id. There is no 
evidence in the record that the Ute Tribe has held an election 
accepting state jurisdiction. Thus, section 9-9-213, granting 
concurrent jurisdiction over hunting, cannot apply. 
1(7 Both parties agree that the crimes in this case, hunting 
without a state license, occurred in "Indian Country." "Under 18 
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U.S.C. § 1151, the Tribe and the federal government have civil 
and criminal jurisdiction over f Indian Country.111 Ute Indian 
Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513, 1529 (10th Cir. 1997) (Ute Tribe 
V). Without the election mentioned above, "state jurisdiction 
over crimes committed in Indian Country is limited to criminal 
acts committed 'by non-Indians against non-Indians . . . and 
victimless crimes by non-Indians. '" State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 
60,f4, 65 P.3d 1191 (alteration in original) (quoting Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984)). If either the defendant 
or the victim is an Indian, then jurisdiction lies with the 
tribal or federal courts. See Valdez, 2003 UT App 60 at %4 . 
Because we hold that the victim in this case is the Ute Indian 
Tribe, we need not address whether Defendants are Indians. See 
id. 
f8 "The current Uintah and Ouray Reservation is formed from 
portions of two prior reservations, the Uintah Valley 
Reservation, which was originally inhabited by the Uintah and 
Whiteriver Bands of Ute Indians, and the Uncompahgre Reservation, 
which was originally inhabited by the Uncompahgre Band." United 
States v. Von Murdock, 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 1997). "In 
193 7, . . . the three Bands joined together to form the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and adopted a 
constitution and bylaws." Id. (footnote omitted). In 1950, 
representatives from each of the Bands "signed a series of five 
tribal resolutions which completed the transition, which began 
with the constitution, from loosely-knit Bands to [the] unified 
Ute Tribe." Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1461 (10th Cir. 
1994). The constitution specified that the separate Bands ceased 
to exist outside the Ute Tribe, and the Ute Tribe maintained 
jurisdiction over the reservation areas and the hunting and 
fishing rights.2 See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541. 
1|9 The State asserts that it was the victim in this case, and 
because the State is not an Indian, state courts have 
jurisdiction over the offense. The State, however, is not the 
victim. The State concedes in its brief that the crime took 
place "in Uintah County on land that was within the original 
boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reservation and is !Indian 
2. The original reservation "was created by executive order and 
approved by an act of Congress." Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 
F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). The act set 
apart the Uintah Valley for "the permanent settlement and 
exclusive occupancy of Utah Indian tribes [and] recognized and 
guaranteed the Indian rights of the tribes who settled there." 
Id. Those rights include the right to hunt. See id. ("!As a 
general rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and 
fish on lands reserved to them . . . .r" (citation omitted)). 
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Country.1" There were disputes as to whether the 1894 and 1897 
Acts of Congress disestablished the Uncompahgre Reservation. See 
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1090-93 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(Ute Indian Tribe III). In Ute Indian Tribe III, however, the 
court held that the acts did not "disturb the ownership of the 
land by the tribal group." Id. at 1092. The original 
Uncompahgre Reservation is therefore considered Indian Country, 
which falls under the Ute Tribe's civil and criminal 
jurisdiction. See Ute Indian Tribe V, 114 F.3d at 1530 
(confirming Ute Indian Tribe III that the tribe and federal 
government retained jurisdiction over the Uncompahgre 
Reservation). Thus, Defendants shot the deer in Indian Country 
governed by the Ute Tribe. 
1|l0 Alternatively, the State asserts that the crime is 
victimless. A victimless crime is a " [t]erm applied to a crime 
which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no 
direct victim, as in the crime of illegal possession of drugs." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1085 (6th ed. 1991). For purposes of 
Indian law, it has been emphasized that victimless crimes must be 
"truly victimless." William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law 
166 (3d ed. 1998). "Crimes against Indian property interests are 
not victimless even though no Indian person is directly 
assaulted; Indian interests are affected and that fact places the 
crime within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government." Id. 
Ull "The right to hunt and fish on reservation land is a long-
established tribal right." United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 
1505, 1509 (10th Cir. 1985). Additionally, "'[a]side from the 
right to hunt or fish on tribal lands to the exclusion of others, 
the tribe possesses the discretion inherent in the police power 
to regulate and allocate the fish and game resources as it sees 
fit, within the constraints imposed by law.1" Id. at 1511 
(quoting United States v. Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1023 (D. 
Utah 1982)). Thus, the Ute Tribe has a regulatory interest over 
hunting and fishing on the land it governs. Because Defendants1 
acts of hunting on Indian Country affected the Ute Tribe's 
regulatory interest, the tribe is the victim.3 
3. An argument might also be made that the Ute Tribe had a 
property interest in the wildlife. In United States v. Von 
Murdock, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997), the court stated that 
"
f
 [t]ribal rights in property are owned by the tribal entity, 
. . . including hunting and fishing rights.'" Id. at 538 
(quoting United States v. Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (D. 
Utah 1982)). In Utah Code section 9-9-211, our legislature 
recognized a property right, noting that when a person goes on an 
(continued...) 
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Kl2 In holding that the defendant in Von Murdock was not an 
Indian, the 10th Circuit court asserted jurisdiction and affirmed 
the conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1165, which prohibits 
hunting on land belonging to an Indian tribe without permission. 
See Von Murdock, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997). Likewise, in 
Felter, the court found that because the defendant no longer 
maintained Indian status, the federal court could assert 
jurisdiction rather than the tribal court. See Felter, 752 F.2d 
1505. The Felter court noted "that 18 U.S.C. § 1165 is not 
applicable to tribal members who hunted in violation of tribal 
regulation. Tribal jurisdiction over such minor offenses remains 
exclusive." Id. at 1512 n.ll (quoting Felter, 54 6 F. Supp. at 
1026). It remains clear, however, that "Indian tribes lack 
jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians for criminal offenses, 
and [thus,] 18 U.S.C. § 1165 was designed to fill the gap in 
enforcement powers as to non-Indians hunting or fishing on tribal 
or other Indians lands without tribal permission." Id. The 
Felter court thus reasoned that an Indian hunting on Indian lands 
is under tribal jurisdiction, but a non-Indian hunting on Indian 
lands is under federal jurisdiction. Nothing in Von Murdock or 
Felter suggests that state courts can ever assert jurisdiction 
over hunting violations committed on Indian lands. 
CONCLUSION 
Hl3 We conclude that the crimes occurred in Indian Country 
governed by the Ute Tribe. Because the Ute Tribe is the victim, 
3. (...continued) 
Indian reservation and participates in hunting without proper 
authority then all "game . . . in the defendant's possession 
shall be forfeited to the tribe." Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-211 
(2003). Similarly, pursuant to its jurisdiction over the land, 
the Ute Tribe claims a property interest in the wildlife. 
Section 8-1-3(1) of the Ute Law and Order Code states: 
All wildlife now or hereafter within the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, not held by 
private ownership legally acquired, and which 
for purposes of this Code shall include all 
big game animals . . . are hereby declared to 
be the property of the Ute Indian Tribe. 
Ute Law and Order Code § 8-1-3(1); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-3 
(2003) ("All wildlife existing within this state, not held by 
ownership and legally acquired, is the property of the state."). 
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the State does not have jurisdiction. We therefore vacate the 
convictions. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
114 WE CONCUR: 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 8, clause 3, United States Constitution 
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. 
Article II, Section 2, clause 2, United States Constitution 
The President shal l . . . have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur. 
Executive Order of October 3, 1861 
Department of the Interior 
Washington, October 3, 1861 
SIR: I have the honor herewith to submit for your consideration the 
recommendation of the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the 
Uintah Valley, in the Territory of Utah, be set apart and reserved for the use 
and occupancy of Indian tribes. 
In the absence of an authorized survey (the valley and surrounding 
country being as yet unoccupied by settlement of our citizens), I 
respectfully recommend that you order the entire valley of the Uintah River 
within Utah Territory, extending on both sides of said river to the crest of 
the first range of contiguous mountains on each side, to be reserved to the 
United States and set apart as an Indian reservation. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
CALEB B. SMITH, Secretary, 
THE PRESIDENT. 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, October 3, 1861 
Let the reservation be established, as recommended by the Secretary 
of the Interior. 
A. LINCOLN 
Act of May 5, 1864, ch. LXXVII, 13 Stat. 63 
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the superintendent of Indian 
affairs for the territory of Utah be, and he is hereby, authorized and 
required to collect and settle all or so many of the Indians of said territory 
as may be found practicable in the Uinta valley, in said territory, which is 
hereby set apart for the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of 
such of the different tribes of Indians of said territory as may be induced to 
inhabit the same. 
Article III, Section 2, Utah Constitution 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying 
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain 
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall 
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the 
United States. 
U.C.A. §76-2-304(2) 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a 
penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably 
believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a 
written order or grant of permission by an administrative 
agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an 
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant 
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